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JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS OVER COUNTERCLAIMS 
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES 
Procedural limitations on claims against the federal government pose 
numerous problems for private party defendants who seek to bring a 
counterclaim for damages against the government. Sovereign immunity 
arguably protects the government from counterclaims;1 however, courts 
often find a waiver of immunity when the government institutes the 
original suit2 or when the Tucker Act3 is applicable. Using variations of 
these waiver theories, the district courts have established different upper 
limits on counterclaims against the government. 4 Whenever a defendant 
counterclaims for an amount that exceeds the upper limit established by 
the particular district court, potential jurisdictional conflicts between the 
Court of Claims and the district court arise. If the defendant seeks to bring 
another suit, in the Court of Claims, for the amount in excess of the 
counterclaim permitted he must avoid the statutory restrictions placed 
upon the splitting of claims.5 Alternatively, he may seek a transfer of the 
entire case to the Court of Claims. Such transfers, however, are not 
granted automatically, and no right to a jury trial exists in that court. 6 
Thus, under existing law, the extent to which the defendant may coun-
terclaim against the government will be determined by the size of the 
counterclaim and the particular court in which the suit is tried, rather than 
by the substantive merits of the counterclaim. 
This article .first discusses the different approaches that courts have 
used in determining district court jurisdiction over counterclaims and the 
differing limits that are imposed upon the size of the counterclaim. Sec-
ond, it examines the relationship between the Court of Claims and the 
district courts in cases where the defendant cannot counterclaim for full 
relief in a district court. The article concludes with several legislative 
proposals that could lessen the uncertainty and lack of uniformity among 
the courts currently facing a defendant who wants to counterclaim against 
the government. 
I. DISTRICT COURT JURISDICTION 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that courts do not have 
jurisdiction over a claim against the United States government by one of 
1 See notes 7-14 and accompanying text infra. 
2 See notes 15-28 and accompanying text infra. 
3 See notes 33-47 and accompanying text infra. 
• See notes 48-52 and accompanying text infra. 
5 See notes 56-57 and accompanying text infra. 
6 See notes 67-77 and accompanying text infra. 
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its citizens unless the government waives its immunity and consents to 
the suit. 7 The doctrine was first mentioned in Cohens v. Virginia 8 by 
Chief Justice Marshall, and in United States v. Lee, 9 the Supreme Court 
noted that it had repeatedly accepted the firmly entrenched doctrine 
without discussion or analysis. 10 There is no statutory basis for the 
doctrine, and the reasons generally given for it have been discredited by 
modem commentary .11 Recognizing the insubstantial legal basis of the 
doctrine, modern courts have often limited the preclusive effect of 
sovereign immunity. 12 Nonetheless, some modern judicial decisions still 
rely upon the doctrine to deny jurisdiction. 13 Therefore, the doctrine still 
presents a problem for a potential counterclaimant, because a coun-
terclaim, like an original suit, is subject to the bar of sovereign immunity, 
unless there is a waiver of the immunity. 14 
1 See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (194i); Keifer & Keifer v. Recon-
struction Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381 (1939), Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 
(1939); Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331 (1907); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 
(1882); United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486 (1878); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 
Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
8 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 380 (1821). 
9 106 U.S. 196 (1882). 
10 The Court stated that, 
while the exemption of the United States and of the several states from being 
subjected as defendants to ordinary actions in the courts has since . . . been 
repeatedly asserted here, the principle has never been discussed or the reasons for 
it given, but it has always been treated as an established doctrine. 
Id. at 207. 
11 See Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for 
Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defen-
dant, 68 M1cH. L. REv. 387 (1970), where the author stated: 
At various times it has been stated that the basis of the doctrine is, first, the 
traditional immunity of the English sovereign surviving by implication the constitu-
tional grant of judicial power over "Controversies to which the United States shall 
be a party"; second, the inability of the courts to enforce a judgment against the 
federal executive without its aid; and, third, the "logical and practical ground that 
there car be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the 
right depends." These conceptual arguments for sovereign immunity are now 
totally discredited. The only rationale f<;>r the doctrine that is now regarded as 
respectable by courts and commentators alike is that official actions of the Gov-
ernment must be protected from undue judicial interference. (emphasis in original, 
footnotes omitted) 
Id. at 396-97. 
12 See, e.g., National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955); United States 
v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951); Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 
306 U.S. 381 (1939). In Yellow Cab, the Court refused to apply sovereign immunity to 
cross-claims against the g9vernment under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) 
(1970), although the statute only provided for a waiver of immunity for claims and did not 
mention cross-claims. 
13 See, e.g., United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah 
v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); International Eng'r. Co. v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 573 
(D.C.Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1048 (1976); United States v. Mescalero Apache 
Tribe, 518 F.2d 1309 (Ct. Cl. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976). 
14 See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940); Nassau Smelting & Refining 
Works, Ltd. v. United States, 266 U.S. 101 (1924); Danning v. United States, 259 F.2d 305 
(9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 911 (1959); United States v. Wissahickon Tool Works: 
Inc., 200 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1952). Nassau Smelting held that "[t]he objection to a suit against 
the United States is fundamental, whether it be in the form of an original action or a set-off 
or a counterclaim. Jurisdiction in either case does not exist unless there is specific congres-
sional authority for it." 266 U.S. at 106. · 
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A. Implied Waiver of Sovereign Immunity 
It is now generally accepted that when the government initiates a suit, 
the defendant has a right to complete recoupment 15 of his damages, 
because the government waives its sovereign immunity to the extent of its 
claim by bringing the action. 16 In Bull v. United States, 17 the Court 
recognized that a defendant has a right of recoupment in a suit instituted 
by the government. 18 In United States v. Martin, 19 a declaratory action 
was brought by the United States to determine the rights of parties 
affected by a federal water diversion project. Neighboring ranchers inter-
vened and were permitted recoupment. The court stated that "when the 
United States institutes a suit, it thereby consents by implication to the 
full and complete adjudication of all matters and issues which are rea-
sonably incident thereto. " 20 
Courts generally permit a party sued by the government to set-off2 1 any 
claims that the party has against the government. 22 It is required by 28 
U.S.C. § 2406 that such claims must first be presented to and denied by 
the General Accounting Office. 23 Although the statute appears only to 
outline procedural requirements· for set-offs, the Supreme Court, in 
United States v. Wilkins, 24 held that the statute acts as a waiver of 
15 Recoupment and set-off can be used to offset the amount of the government's claim but 
cannot be used as a means of getting affinnative relief. A recoupment claim must be based 
on the transaction sued upon by the plaintiff and historically has been justified as a means of 
avoiding multiple suits on a single controversy between the parties. A set-off claim permits 
the presentation of valid claims based on different transactions that involve the same parties. 
The set-off or recoupment claim must seek the same type of relief sought by the original suit. 
See, e.g., Frederick v. United States, 386 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1967); In re Greenstreet, Inc., 
209 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1954); United States v. Ameco Electronic Corp., 224 F. Supp. 783 
(E.D.N. Y. 1963). For a more extended discussion of recoupment and set-off and their effect 
on modem counterclaims, see generally, F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 
10.14-.16 (2d ed. 1977). 
16 See, e.g., Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935); United States v. Agnew, 423 F.2d 
513 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Martin, 267 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1959); United States v. 
Gregory ?ark, 373 F. Supp. 317 (D.N.J. 1974); United States v. Taylor, 342 F. Supp. 715 (D. 
Kan. 1972). 
17 295 U.S. 247, 261-62 (1935). 
18 The Court actually stated that the recoupment .claim was valid and merely addressed 
the question of whether the statute of limitations was applicable. 
1• 267 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1959). 
20 Id. at 769. See also United States v. Timber Access Indus. Co., 54 F.R.D. 36 (D. Ore. 
1971), where the government conceded that defendant had a right of recoupment not in 
excess of the government's claim. 
"' See note 15 supra. 
22 See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940); United States v. Wilkins, 19 U.S. 
(6 Wheat.) 135 (1821); United States v. Agnew, 423 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1970); In re 
Greenstreet, Inc., 209 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1954); United States v. Boris, 122 F. Supp. 936 
(E.D. Pa. 1954); United States v. Stephanidis, 41 F.2d 958 (E.D.N.Y. 1930), affd, 47 F.2d 
554 (2d Cir. 1931). 
23 28 U.S.C. § 2406 (1970) provides: 
In an action by the United States against an individual, evidence supporting the 
defendant's claim for a credit shall not be admitted unless he first proves that such 
claim has been disallowed, in whole or in part, by the General Accounting Office, 
or that he has. at the time of the trial, obtained possession of vouchers not 
previously procurable and has been prevented from presenting such claim to the 
General Accounting Office by absence from the United States or unavoidable 
accident. 
24 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 135 (1821). 
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sovereign immunity for set-offs when the government initiates a suit. 25 
The Court reasoned that the statute did not specify any types of claims for 
credit which would not be allowed. Since the purpose appeared to be the 
settlement of all accounts in a single suit, the Court construed the statute 
to permit all set-off claims.26 
Arguably, the implied waiver theory supports complete waiver of im-
munity whenever the government institutes a suit. In United States v. 
Shaw, 27 however, .the Supreme Court refused to find that the institution 
of a suit constituted a complete waiver of sovereign immunity. In Shaw, 
the government sued the estate of Shaw for damages due to conversion of 
certain properties left with Shaw as bailee. The estate counterclaimed for 
damages on a subcontract for which a government corporation had agreed 
to assume responsibility. The state supreme court upheld both claims, but 
the Supreme Court reversed with regard to the counterclaim. The Court 
reasoned that although the waiver of sovereign immunity can be extended 
by legislation, "[i]t is not our right to extend the waiver of sovereign 
immunity more broadly than has been directed by the Congress .... 
Against the background of complete immunity we find no Congressional 
action modifying the immunity rule in favor of cross-actions beyond the 
amount necessary as a set-off. " 28 
B. Express Waiver of Sovereign Immunity 
The government may expressly waive its immunity by statute.29 The 
Court of Claims Act of 1855,30 the applicable part of which is now 28 
25 Accord, Watkins v. United States, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 759 (1870); United States v. 
Buchanan, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 83 (1850); United States v. Bank of Metropolis, 40 U.S. (15 
Pet.) 377 (1841); United States v. Ringgold, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 150 (1834). 
26 The Court stated: 
There being no limitation as to the nature and origin of the claim for a credit 
which may be set up in the suit, we think it a reasonable construction of the act, 
that it is intended to allow the defendant the full benefit at the trial of any credit, 
whether arising out of the particular transaction for which he was sued, or out of 
any distinct and independent transaction, which would constitute a legal or equita-
ble set-off, in whole or in part, of the debt sued for by the United States. The object 
of the act seems to be to liquidate and adjust all accounts between the parties, and 
to require a judgment for such sum only, as the defendant in equity and justice 
should be proved to owe to the United States. 
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 144. Given this authority, recent cases involving the interpretation of§ 
2406 have been concerned only with the procedure of presenting the set-off claim. See, e.g., 
United States v. Frank, 207 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Boris, 122 F. 
Supp. 936 (E.D. Pa. 1954). But see Frederick v. United States, 386 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1967), 
where the court said § 2406 had no effect when the sovereign had waived its immunity by 
filing suit. 
27 3()() u .s. 495 (1940). 
28 Id. at 502. But see United States v. Finn, 127 F. Supp. 158 (S.D. Cal. 1954), modified, 
239 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1956), where the district court held that the Shaw decision did not 
apply where the controversy concerned the possession of property seized by the govern-
ment instead of monetary damages. 
29 For example, the government has recognized its ability to waive sovereign immunity in 
FED. R. C1v. P. 13(d). which states: "These rules shall not be construed to enlarge beyond 
the limits now fixed by law the right to assert counterclaims or to claim credits against the 
United States or an officer or agency thereof." Cf. United States v. Sherwood. 312 U.S. 584 
(1941), where the Court held that the district court could not use certain procedural rules 
dealing with third party defendants to expand its jurisdiction. 
30 IO Stat. 612 (1855). 
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U.S.C. § 1491,31 created the Court of Claims, and granted itjurisdiction to 
hear certain specified claims against the federal government. Prior to its 
enactment, Congress had to respond directly to each claim presented 
against the govern_ment. The Court of Claims relieved Congress of this 
burden.32 
The Tucker Act of 1887, 33 the applicable part of which is now 28 U .S.C. 
§ 1346(a), (c), 34 granted ~he district courts original jurisdiction, concurrent 
with the Court of Claims, over certain a\:tions or claims against the 
government that do not exceed $10,000. Since the statute refers only to 
civil actions or claims, courts have differed concerning district courts 
jurisdiction over counterclaims filed in response to government-instituted 
suits. 
The original view, curreritly the minority position, applied only to 
original suits and does not grant the district courts jurisdiction over 
counterclaims against the government. 35 The leading case supporting this 
view is United States v. Nipissing Mines Co., 36 which involved a suit by 
the government to recover assessed taxes and a counterclaim for other 
taxes erroneously paid and not returned by the government. The Second 
Circuit relied upon the literal language of the Act in finding that "the 
Tucker Act of 1887 ... is not broad enough to permit the recovery of 
demands upon counterclaims. We think that that statute refers to original 
suits and prescribes procedure inconsistent with its use as the basis of a 
31 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970) provides in part: 
The court of claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim 
against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of 
Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or 
implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages 
in cases not sounding in tort. 
32 See generally Shea, Statutory Jurisdiction of the Court of Claims: Past, Present and 
Future, 29 FED. B. J. 157 (1970). 
33 24 Stat. 505 (1887). The Tucker Act also incorporated the Court of Claims Act cited in 
note 30, supra. 
34 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970) provides: 
(a) The district courts shall have originaljurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of 
Claims, of: 
(I) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-
revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or col-
lected ... 
(2) Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding 
$10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Con-
gress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or 
implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated dam-
ages in cases not sounding in tort. 
(c) The jurisdiction conferred by this section includes jurisdiction of any set-off, 
counterclaim, or other claim or demand whatever on the part of the United States 
against any plaintiff commencing an action under this section 
35 See, e.g., United States v. Nipissing Mines Co., 206 F. 431 (2d Cir. 1913), appeal 
dismissed, 234 U.S. 765 (1914); United States v. Thurber, 376 F. Supp. 670 (D. Vt. 1974); 
United States v. Ameco Electronic Corp., 224 F. Supp. 783 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); United States 
v. Carey Terminal Corp., 209 F. Supp. 385 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Wissahickon 
Tool Works, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), afj'd, 200 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1952). 
36 206 F. 431 (2d Cir. 1913), appeal dismissed, 234 U.S. 765 (1914). 
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counterclaim. " 37 United States v. Wissahickon Tool Works, Inc,, 38 pro-· 
vides a further rationale for this original view. In holding that coun-
terclaims could not be filed under the Tucker Act, the Wissahickon court 
stressed that tpe Tucker Act expressly provides for counterclaims by the 
government in section 1346(c)39 and presumed that the omission by the 
drafters of a similar provision for private party counterclaims was inten-
tional. 40 Although the Second Circuit continues to employ the ,original 
view, 41 several district courts of the Second Circuit, noting that most 
other jurisdictions have rejected this rule, have called for a reexamination 
of the question by the circuit court. 42 
The modem rpajority view is that the Tucker Act applies to coun-
terclaims as well as to original suits against the government. 43 The princi-
pal case so holding is United States v. Silverton, 44 in which the govern~ 
ment sued for the balance of the purchase price of scrap webbing, and the 
defendant counterchtjmed for damages due to defects in the goods. The 
First Circuit 'held that the Tucker Act permitted the defendants to bring a 
counterclaim against the government where the facts establishing the 
counterclaim would have permitted the defendant to bring an original suit 
against the government in the district court. In United States v. 
Springfield, 45 the court noted that if the counterclaim is required to be. 
brought as a separate suit, it can still be consolidated with the original 
suit, and that such wasteful litigation should be avoided. 46 Furthermore, 
in United States v. Rudis, 47 the court observed that if the Tucker Act was 
meant to apply only tQ original suits, the statute need not have referred to 
both civil actions and claims, because a reference to civil actions alone 
would have included all original suits. 
37 Id. at 434. There is no legislative history on this point. 
38 84 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff'd, 200 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1952). 
39 See note 34 supra. 
40 Accord, United States v. Double Bend Mfg. Co., 114 F. Supp .. 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
Note, however, that government counterclaims would never qualify under§ 1346 (2), whife 
private counterclaims might. · 
41 Despite their adherence to this original view, the courts of the Second Circuit still 
recognize a defendant's right to recoupment and set-off. See, e.g., United States v. Thurber, 
376 F. Supp. 670 (D. Vt. 1974); United States v. Carey Terminal Corp., 209 F. Supp. 385 
(E.D.N.Y. 1962). 
42 See, e.g., United States v. Ameco Electronics Corp., 224 F. Supp. 783, 785 (E.D.N.Y. 
1963); United States v. Frank, 207 F. Supp. 216, 220 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
43 See, e.g., United States v. Bursey, 515 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. 
Springfield, 276 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1960); Thompson v. United States, 250 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 
1957); United States v. Silverton, 200 F.2d 824 (!st Cir. 1952); United States v. Holder, 292 
F. Supp 826 (S.D. Iowa 1968); United States v. Rudis, 178 F. Supp 864 (N.D. Ill. 1959); 
United States v. King, 119 F. Supp. 398 (D. Alas. 1954). 
44 200 F.2d 824 (!st Cir. 1952). 
45 276 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1960). 
46 The court stated: 
We think the statute should be interpreted from a practical rather than technical 
standpoint. Nothing in the statute itself precludes such an interpretation. And in a 
situation where no substantive rights are at stake, the only question being whether 
litigation is going to be disposed of in an expeditious or inexpeditious manner, we 
think that an interpretation which Jends itself to sound judicial administration is 
justified. 
276 F.2d at 804. 
47 178 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. Ill. 1959). 
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Courts adopting the modern majority position have differed over 
whether the Tucker Act supplements, displaces, or provides an alterna-
tive to the theories of recoupment and set-off. 48 Such an interpretation 
denies the district courts jurisdiction over a valid counterclaim in excess 
of $10,000 when the defendant could otherwise recoup or set-off a claim 
regardless of the amount. 
Many courts have used an either-or approach in relating the Tucker Act 
to the rights of recoupment and set-off. 49 These decisions recognize that 
the Tucker Act applies to counterclaims but hold that a defendant can use 
recoupment or set-off instead of relying on the Tucker Act. Other modern 
courts have extended this either-or approach and have held that there is a 
full right to recoupment or set-off in addition to a right to counterclaim for 
up to $10,000 under the Tucker Act. 50 In short, these courts hold that the 
Tucker Act places a $10,000 limit on the affirmative relief that can be 
sought by counterclaim without affecting a right to recoupment or set-off. 
For example, in United States v. · Summ, 51 the court found a right to 
recoupment equal to the government's original claim plus a right to 
$10,000 affirmative recovery under the Tucker Act. The virtue of this 
approach is that it places the same limit on affirmative relief recoverable 
by counterclaim that would apply to a suit originally filed by a private 
party against the government in district court.52 
II. COURT OF CLAIMS JURISDICTION 
Under any interpretation of the Tucker Act, some counterclaims will 
exceed the jurisdictional dollar limit of the district court. This will happen 
at least whenever the counterclaim exceeds the government's claim by 
more than $10,000. 53 Accordingly, a defendant must either institute a new 
suit in the Court of Claims to recover the remainder of his claim54 or seek 
a transfer of the original suit to the Court of Claims so that his entire 
counterclaim can be presented in one suit. 55 
48 See, e.g., North Dakota-Montana Wheat Growers Ass'n. v. United States, 66 F.2d 573 
(8th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 672 (1934); United States v. United States Tin Corp., 
148 F. Supp 922 (D. Alas. 1957). 
49 See, e.g., Lowell 0. West Lumber Sales v. United States, 270 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1959); 
United States v. Gregory Park, Section II, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 317 (D.N.J. 1974); United 
States v. Zashin, 160 F. Supp. 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1958). 
50 See, e.g., United States v. Timber Access Indus. Co., 54 F.R.D. 36 (D. Ore. 1971); 
United States v. Summ, 282 F. Supp. 628 (D.N.J. 1968); United States v. Buffalo Coal 
Mining Co., 170 F. Supp. 727 (D. Alas. 1959), modified, 343 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1965); United 
States v. Petaschnick, 143 F. Supp 206 (E.D. Wis. 1956). 
51 282 F. Supp. 628 (D.N.J. 1968). 
52 But see United States v. Petaschnick, 143 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Wis. 1956), where 
multiple counterclaims were permitted after set-off, since each additional counterclaim was 
under $10,000. 
53 See notes 48-52 and accompanying text supra. 
54 See notes 56-66 and accompanying text infra. 
55 See notes 67-77 and accompanying text infra. 
FALL 1977] Counterclaims against the United States 117 
A. Pending Claims 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1500,56 the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction over 
any claim that is pending in another court. Enacted after the Civil War, 
this provision addressed the problem of damage claims being presented 
against an agent of the government in district court and also against the 
government in the Court of Claims if the other suit failed. 57 Although 
enacted before the Tucker Act's extension of district court jurisdiction, 
section 1500 has been applied to Tucker Act claims, but its specific 
applicability to Tucker Act counterclaims has never been considered by 
the Court of Claims.58 In Wessel, Duval & Co. v. United States, 59 the 
plaintiff filed the same suit in both the district court and the Court of 
Claims, because he was uncertain which court had jurisdiction and did not 
want to risk an expiration of the statute of Iimitations.60 The Court of 
Claims noted that the plaintiff was not attempting to present the same 
claim twice but held that the strict language of section 1500 prevented the 
maintenance of the suit in the Court of Claims.61 
In other cases, the Court of Claims has read section 1500 liberally to 
avoid harsh results. In Tecon Engineers, Inc. v. United States, 62 the 
district court suit was filed after a suit had been instituted in the Court of 
Claims. The Court of Claims retained jurisdiction, reasoning that a con-
trary result would mean that divestiture of its jurisdiction and delay.of the 
litigation could be obtained merely by a later filing in district court. It 
further noted that language had been deleted from the proposed version of 
section 1500 that would have divested the Court of Claims of jurisdiction 
under these circumstances.63 Courts generally avoid a strict application of 
section 1500 when the private party is unable to obtain full relief on the 
56 28 U.S.C. § 1500 (1970) provides: 
The Court of Claims shall not have jurisdiction of any claim for or in respect to 
which the plaintiff or his assignee has pending in any other court any suit or process 
against the United States or any person who, at the time when the cause of action 
alleged in such suit or process arose, was, in respect thereto, acting or professing to 
act, directly or indirectly under the. authority of the United States. 
57 At the time, this problem could not be prevented by the doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel. See Schwartz, Section 1500 of the Judicial Code and Duplicate Suits 
Against the Government and Its Agents, 55 GEO. L.J. 573, 574-80 (1967). 
58 However, several district courts have stated that the portion of a counterclaim which ·is 
too large to bring in district court can be brought as a separate suit before the Court of 
Claims. See, e.g., United States v. Timber Access Indus. Co., 54 F.R.D. 36 (D. Ore. 1971); 
United States v. Buffalo Coal Mining Co., 170 F. Supp. 727 (D. Alas. 1959). 
59 124 F. Supp. 636 (Ct. Cl. 1954). 
60 Id. at 637. Plaintiff was not sure whether the suit should be brought under the Tucker 
Act, the Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. § 781 (1970), or the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. 
§ 741 (1970). Pertinent parts of the latter two Acts have not been changed since the case was 
decided. 
61 124 F. Supp. at 637-38. Accord, National Cored Forgings Co. v. United States, 132 F. 
Supp. 454 (Ct. Cl. 1955). But cf., Oakland Truck Sales Inc., v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 
902 (Ct. Cl. 1957) where the court maintained jurisdiction when the other suit was filed in the 
court of a foreign country. 
62 343 F.2d 943 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 976 (1966). 
63 Id. at 947. The words "or shall commence and have pending" followed the words 
"have commenced and has pending" in the proposed version. 
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claim in one court. 64 For example, in Casman v. United States, 65 the 
plaintiff brought a suit in the Court of Claims for back pay and another 
suit in district court seeking reinstatement to the civil service job from 
wl)ich he had been discharged. The Court of Claims noted that the 
plaintiff was entitled to both types of relief and was forced to bring two 
suits, since neither court could grant full relief. 66 Hence, it held that 
section 1500 did not prevent the suit for back pay. The Casman rationale 
is equally applicable to counterclaims in excess of the district courts' 
jurisdictional limits. If a private party cannot counterclaim for full relief in 
district court, then he must bring another suit in the Court of Claims to 
obtain full relief. Since neither court is prepared to grant the full relief on 
his clairri against the government, the plaintiff should be permitted to 
bring two suits seeking the total relief to which he is entitled. 
B. Transferred Claims 
As an alternative to instituting a separate suit in the Court of Claims, 
the defendant may request a transfer of the entire case to the Court of 
Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(c),67 so that he can counterclaim for full 
relief in one suit. 68 If a court refuses to transfer a case the defendant must 
bring a separate suit in the Court of Claims or abandon the remainder of 
his claim. 69 
Only cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims are 
subject to transfer; however, the courts have not considered this require-
ment. The courts dealing with section 1406 transfers have evidently 
presumed that once a counterclaim against the government has been filed 
the case is within such exclusive jurisdiction. The only significant re-
quirement that the district courts have applied is that the transfer must be 
in the best interests of justice. The courts have enumerated several 
factors in deciding whether this requirement has been satisfied: the stat-
ute of limitations, the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and the 
efficient administration of justice. 70 No cases have found a denial of a 
64 See, e.g., Camero v. United States, 345 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Casman v. United 
States, 135 Ct. Cl. 647 (1956); Pacific Mills v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 541 (Ct. Cl. 1933). 
65 135 Ct. Cl. 647 (1956). 
66 Cf., Meyer v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 314 (Ct. Cl. 1957), where plaintiff was 
permitted to bring a claim for rent against the government in the Court of Claims while 
contesting the government's condemnation proceeding on the leasehold in the district court. 
The Court o_f Claims held that section 1500 did not apply since the plaintiff had initiated only 
one suit, al~hough he was involved in two suits. 
67 28 U .S.C. § 1406 provides: 
(c) If a case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is filed in a 
district court, the district court shall, if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such 
case to the Court of Claims, where the case shall proceed as if it had been filed in 
the Court of Claims on the date it was filed in the district court. 
68 Either party may request a transfer. Under the literal terms of§ 1406(c), it appears that 
the court can transfer on its own motion; however, no cases have presented this question. 
69 In some cases the running of the statute of limitations might bar a second suit. 
70 See Eccles v. United States, 396 F. Supp. 792 (D.N.D. 1975). See also Love v. Taylor, 
415 F.2d 1118 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1023 (1970); Johnson v. Helicopter & 
Airplane Services Corp., 389 F. Supp. 509 (D. Md. 1974), as examples of transfers under§ 
1406 to courts other than the Court of Claims. 
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request to transfer to be unwarranted.7 1 
One reason for denying transfer might be the hardship on the party not 
seeking the transfer. A transfer upon the defendant's timely request72 
probably imposes no hardship on the government, since the Court of 
Claims is located in Washington, D.C. The defendant, however, may not 
wish to transfer the case to the Court of Claims. 
The possible inconvenience of litigating in Washington may deter a 
defendant from seeking a transfer to the Court of Claims. A potential 
problem that a defendant faces if a transfer is granted is that there is no 
right to trial by jury before the Court of Claims. 73 The defendant has a 
right to trial by jury on government claims in suits initiated by the 
government in district courts. 74 If the defendant counterclaims and the 
case is transferred to the Court of Claims, he will lose this right to trial by 
jury. Frantz Equipment Co. v. United States 75 suggests a possible way in 
which the government's use of procedural rules eliminates a defendant's 
right to a jury trial on a government instituted suit if the defendant insists 
on seeking complete relief. In Frantz, the plaintiff brought a suit in the 
Court of Claims and the government counterclaimed. The governmental 
counterclaim had been filed earlier as an original suit in district court 
against plaintiff's predecessor company. The Court of Claims held that 
"the plaintiff, by instituting suit in this court, impliedly consented, as a 
condition to such right to sue the United States, that any counterclaim 
interposed by the United States should be heard and determined by this 
court without the intervention of a jury, " 76 even though there would have 
been a jury trial if the government had pressed its claim in the district 
court. Using the court's reasoning, if a defendant counterclaims against 
the government for the maximum relief available in district court and then 
sues in the Court of Claims for the remainder of his claim, the d~fendant 
loses his right to a jury trial on the government's claim if the government 
obtains a section 1406 transfer. Although such a use of procedural rules 
could be unfair, judicial discussions of the section 1406 criteria of the 
interests of justice have not considered the right to trial by jury. 77 Argu-
ably, the interests of justice should not require or permit a suit instituted 
by the government to be transferred over the objections of the defendant 
where a right to a trial by jury may be lost as a consequence of the 
transfer. 
71 Cf., United States v. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist., 449 F.2d 1 (10th 
Cir. 1971), where a transfer was denied due to an unexplained delay of nine years before the 
transfer request was filed. 
72 The period during which a transfer request should be considered timely might logically 
be made equal to the period during which an original suit could be filed in the Court of 
Claims without being barred by the statute of limitations. 
73 See, e.g., Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943); United States v. Sherwood, 
312 U.S. 584 (1941); McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426 (1880). 
1
• See 28 U .S.C. § 2402 ( 1970) which specifically precludes a jury trial in district court for 
a claim brought by a private party under section 1346. 
75 105 F. Supp. 490 (Ct. Cl. 1952). 
16 Id. at 496. 
11 See note 70 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of factors that are consid-
ered. 
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III. LEGISLATIVE CHANGE 
Inconsistent interpretations of the above statutes have created uncer-
tainty and a lack of uniformity in their application. Depending upon the 
constructions given by a district court, a defendant's counterclaim may be 
limited to recoupment or set-off up to the amount of the government's 
claim, 78 to a maximum of $10,000 under the Tucker Act, 79 to full recoup-
ment or set-off even where the $10,000 Tucker Act limit would ordinarily 
apply, 80 or to full recoupment or set-off plus up to $10,000 in affirmative 
relief under the Tucker Act. 81 If the counterclaim exceeds the limit, the 
defendant who wants full recovery must either bring a separate suit for 
additional relief in the Court of Claims82 or seek a transfer of the entire 
case to the Court of Claims.83 
Much of this uncertainty and unequal treatment can be eliminated by 
minor changes in the relevant statutes. The uncertainty concerning the 
jurisdiction of the district courts over counterclaims could be eliminated 
by amending section 1346(a) to allow claims not exceeding $10,000 in 
"affirmative relief'', instead of referring to $10,000 in "amount". Such an 
amendment would adopt the view of more modem decisions that district 
court jurisdiction is limited to counterclaims requesting no more than 
$10,000 in addition to recoupment or set-off.84 A statutory amendment 
adopting this view would be consistent with the purpose of the Tucker 
Act to create, rather than eliminates district court jurisdiction over claims 
against the government. 
Court decisions have indicated that section 1500 will not act as a bar to 
a separate suit filed in the Court of Claims for the remainder of one's 
claim while the original suit and permitted counterclaim are pending in 
district court.85 However, since the Court of Claims has never ruled on 
this specific issue, 86 changes in section 1500 to refer to a "claim for 
relief'' rather than to a "claim" and to "suit or process for the same 
relief'' rather than to "suit or process" would eliminate the problem. 87 
Such a change would still prevent duplicative litigation without also 
precluding a party from seeking full relief. One commentator has 
suggested that the extended use of res judicata should completely replace 
section 1500.88 While this would adequately prevent anyone from sue-
78 See notes 15-26, 41, and accompanying text supra. 
79 See note 48 and accompanying text supra. 
80 See notes 49 and accompanying text supra. 
81 See notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra. 
82 See notes 56-66 and accompanying text supra. 
83 See notes 67-77 and accompanying text supra. 
84 See notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra. 
85 See notes 56-66 and accompanying text supra. 
86 See note 58 and accompanying text supra. 
87 Although these changes would not prevent misinterpretation by a determined court, 
they are an attempt at reaching the desired result through a minimum of modification. An 
alternative would be simply to add a sentence exempting claims split due to § 1346(a) from 
the scope of § 1500. 
88 See Schwartz, supra note 57, at 599-601. 
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cessfully maintaining two suits for the same relief to judgment, it would 
not avoid the administrative costs of wasteful litigation that could accrue 
if two suits were brought and maintained until judgment was reached in 
one of them. 
The problem concerning transfer can also be lessened by statutory 
change. The possibility of depriving the defendant of the right to a jury 
trial can be removed by amending section 1406 to prevent the government 
from requesting a transfer, 89 thereby limiting it to its original choice of 
forum. Additionally, providing for an automatic transfer upon a timely 
request by the defendant will prevent judicial refusals of proper transfer 
without harming the government. 90 On the other hand, including the right 
to a jury trial as one of the factors to be considered before transfer would 
not provide effective protection, because the court could give the right to 
a jury trial relatively little weight in determining whether a transfer is in 
the interests of justice. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A litigant who wishes to pursue a counterclaim against the government 
is in a difficult and uncertain position. By instituting the action, the 
government has waived its immunity to an uncertain extent. Depending 
upon the court and the size of the counterclaim, the defendant may have 
to litigate two suits or transfer the case to the Court of Claims in order to 
seek complete relief. Legislative change can reduce the difficulties of 
counterclaiming against the government and eliminate the existing lack of 
uniformity in the treatment of these counterclaims by federal courts. 
Section 1346 can be amended to provide a uniform rule for determining 
the permissible size of counterclaims. Amendment of section 1500 can 
permit a second suit to be brought in the Court of Claims if the coun-
terclaim exceeds the jurisdictional limits of the district court, thus permit-
ting full recovery. Protection of the defendant's decision concerning the 
relative merits of a trial by jury and the consolidation of his claim in the 
Court of Claims can be attained through amendment of section 1406. 
While the complete removal of dollar limits on jurisdiction of the district 
courts would solve all of the problems discussed, the fading doctrine of 
sovereign immunity still possesses too much vitality for such a proposal 
to receive serious consideration. 
89 See notes 67-72 and accompanying text supra. 
• 0 See notes 73-77 and accompanying text supra. 
-David G. Swenson 
